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There’s a good chance that if you take an aspirin, your headache will disappear.  
Then again, it might not. 
Decades of clinical trials conducted with hundreds of thousands of ordinary headache 
sufferers confirm that the humble aspirin really works. So, why isn’t your headache  
budging? The answer, or a version of it, is usually somewhere on the package insert:  
individual results may vary. The longer version of the marketing shorthand is this:  
Even the best science—science characterized by rich data collected from multiple  
experimental subjects or events and over multiple trials or experiments—frequently  
can tell us little, if anything at all, about the individual case.
Science seeks to understand general phenomena, not particular instances. Scientists  
typically don’t attempt to infer from group or population-based data (or “G”) to a  
particular individual (or “i”). Answering the individual question simply isn’t part of  
the everyday scientific enterprise. That’s why the applied science that is part of our  
everyday lives—whether in the form of drugs, diagnostic tests, or weather forecasts—
doesn’t come with a promise. It comes with a probability.
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G2i IN THE COURTS: MUDDLING THROUGH
The challenge of reasoning from group data to make 
decisions about individuals—a process we call 
“G2i”—is endemic in the modern courtroom. As in 
everyday life, that challenge is also frequently ignored, 
underestimated, or misunderstood.
Neuroscientists offer evidence that, on average, 
adolescents are less developmentally mature than 
adults. Cognitive psychologists testify to factors 
that contribute to eyewitness misidentification. 
Psychiatrists identify factors associated with “future 
dangerousness.” In each case, experts offer general 
statements about the empirical world based on 
aggregate data across groups of individuals. The 
courts, however, are typically looking for answers 
specific to the case at hand: Is or was this defendant 
developmentally mature? Was this eyewitness’s 
identification accurate? Will this defendant be violent 
in the future? 
Courts are generally guided by one of two cases 
when it comes to admitting—or excluding—scientific 
evidence. Established in 1923, the Frye test asks 
whether the scientific methods supporting the expert 
opinions are generally accepted in the particular fields 
from which they come. Seventy years later, the 
Supreme Court ruled that the applicable federal rules 
of evidence replaced Frye test with a validity test. 
Under that approach, first established in the case of 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., courts 
must determine whether the methods and principles 
underlying the expert opinion are reliable and valid. 
Today, Daubert is the rule in all federal cases. Most 
states have adopted it, as well, and many others have 
been influenced by its reasoning. Neither Frye nor 
Daubert, however, speak directly to G2i.  
Courts are daily confronted with admissibility issues, 
some of which involve the existence of the general 
phenomenon (i.e., “G”) and others the question 
of whether a particular case is an instance of that 
general phenomenon (i.e., “i”). For instance, research 
might indicate that a particular abnormality in a part 
of the brain called the amygdala is associated with 
psychopathy. But many psychopaths have normal 
amygdalae and many non-psychopaths have abnormal 
amygdalae. So although, on average, psychopaths 
might have more abnormal amygdalae than non-
psychopaths, a particular person’s amygdala is not 
diagnostic of psychopathy.
Unfortunately, courts have yet to carefully consider 
the implications of G2i for their admissibility 
decisions. In some areas, courts limit an expert’s 
testimony to the general phenomenon.  They insist 
that whether the case at hand is an instance of that 
phenomenon is exclusively a jury question, and thus 
not an appropriate subject of expert opinion. In other 
cases, in contrast, courts hold that expert evidence 
must be provided on both the group-data issue, i.e., 
that the phenomenon exists, and what is called the 
“diagnostic” issue, i.e., that this case is an instance of 
that phenomenon.
Courts’ treatment of expert testimony on factors that 
might lower the accuracy of eyewitness identifications 
illustrates the “phenomenon only” approach. Courts 
generally permit eyewitness experts to testify about 
factors, such as cross-race identifications or stress, 
that might negatively affect accuracy. They do not 
permit testimony, however, on whether a particular 
identification was accurate or not. In United States v. 
Smith, for instance, the court explained that the value 
of this general testimony was educative: “Educating 
the jury about this research … is an important step 
along the road to using improved scientific knowledge 
to create more accurate and fair legal proceedings.” 
The testimony was not, the Smith court emphasized, 
diagnostic: “Applying this research to the facts of the 
case is within the sole province of the jury.”
Yet in a host of other cases, the courts either demand 
or permit experts to offer diagnostic opinions on 
whether the case at hand is an instance of some 
legally relevant phenomenon. In medical causation 
cases, for example, a plaintiff must introduce expert 
testimony on both “G” and “i”. A plaintiff claiming 
that benzene exposure caused his or her leukemia, 
for instance, would have to introduce both general 
scientific evidence that benzene causes leukemia 
and scientific diagnostic evidence that exposure 
to benzene specifically caused his or her leukemia. 
In cases involving forensic identification—ranging 
from fingerprints to firearms—the courts generally 
allow experts to testify to both “G” and “i”. Thus, a 
firearms expert typically testifies that certain marks 
on cartridge cases are associated with a group of 
firearms and, additionally, that the marks on the 
cartridge case found at the crime scene were made 
by a specific gun.
Unfortunately, the cases in which the courts insist 
on, or permit, diagnostic testimony do not necessarily 
align with scientists’ ability to offer valid diagnostic 
opinions. It is exceedingly difficult to determine 
whether a particular case of leukemia is attributable to 
benzene exposure, and it’s impossible to say that the 
marks on a cartridge case came from a particular gun. 
A key insight of G2i, then, is that courts should assess 
an expert’s ability to provide empirical framework 
evidence separately from his or her ability to provide 
diagnostic evidence.
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS:  
THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN
Three decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
illustrate both how far we have come and how far 
we still have to go in understanding the limitations of 
scientific inference. All three cases involved group-
level behavioral and neuroscience research that 
demonstrates that the brain, with its concomitant 
developmental capacities, does not fully mature until 
the early 20s. 
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In Roper v. Simmons (2005), the Court held that the 
Eighth Amendment did not permit imposing the death 
penalty on a defendant who had killed prior to his 
eighteenth birthday. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Kennedy implicitly acknowledged that justice must 
take into account both the validity of the “G”—the 
empirical evidence that on average the adolescent is 
not developmentally mature—and the difficulty of the 
“i,” that is, of knowing whether a particular adolescent 
is mature or not.
“[T]he differences between juvenile and adult 
offenders,” Kennedy  wrote, “are too marked and 
well understood to risk allowing a youthful person 
to receive the death penalty despite insufficient 
culpability.” Drawing a line at 18 years of age, the 
Court allowed, was arbitrary but necessary under 
the circumstances. “It is difficult even for expert 
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile 
offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet 
transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender 
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption,” he wrote.
In Graham v Florida (2009), the Court extended this 
reasoning to another set of juvenile offenders, those 
facing life without parole for crimes other than 
homicide. The decision, like the one in Roper, was 
categorical, applying to all individuals below the age 
of 18 at the time the crime was committed. Again, 
the Court explained, “even if we were to assume 
that some juvenile nonhomicide offenders…merit a 
life without parole sentence, it does not follow that 
courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach 
could with sufficient accuracy distinguish the few 
incorrigible juvenile offenders from the many that 
have the capacity for change.”
Finally, in Miller v. Alabama (2013), the Court 
concluded that the Eighth Amendment also prohibits 
mandatory life without parole for juveniles convicted 
of homicide. Citing both Roper and Graham, once 
again the Court’s decision referenced scientific 
findings that “both lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ 
and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by 
and neurological development occurs, his ‘deficiencies 
will be reformed.’” It also reiterated the previously 
noted difficulty of distinguishing between “transient 
immaturity” and “irreparable corruption.” 
Yet in Miller, the Court declined to “foreclose a 
sentencer’s ability” to make that distinction. That 
is, unlike Roper and Graham, Miller gave courts the 
option of sentencing youthful offenders to life without 
parole on a case-by-case basis, despite the fact that 
there is no available neuroscience research to aid 
such a determination. There is no neural signature 
for maturity, no single psychological test that directly 
reveals how well developed an individual person is. 
Justice Kagan, writing for the Miller Court, did note the 
incongruity between the earlier cases of Roper and 
Graham and the one before her.  She believed that the 
scientific studies regarding the average maturity of 
adolescents might create something of a presumption 
against Life Without Parole sentences for youthful 
offenders.  As she put it, “appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty 
will be uncommon.”
Do the inherent challenges of G2i, then, constitute an 
unbridgeable gulf between science and the law? We 
think not. Although G2i decsribes a fundamental divide 
between the two disciplines, and perhaps no single 
structure is available to bridge it—at least, not yet—it’s 
a division that might be managed effectively.
Effective management will depend both on paying 
attention to the specific legal context and on the 
science that might be available at the time in each 
of those contexts. Consider, for example, the issue 
raised by the Miller case. The Court found that 
the state of the science indicated legally relevant 
differences in maturity between adolescents 
and adults, which supported its ruling that it was 
unconstitutional to sentence adolescent homicide 
offenders to mandatory life in prison. The science 
on adolescents as a group thus helped establish 
the constitutional rule. But, as a practical matter, 
courts must now sentence individual adolescents. 
Almost certainly, at sentencing the parties will seek 
to introduce “scientific” expert testimony that 
supports their side—for the defendant, that he was 
developmentally immature at the time of the crime 
and, for the prosecution, that the defendant was as 
developmentally mature as an average adult when he 
committed the crime. 
Should courts admit this form of diagnostic expert 
evidence? The answer rests on a G2i evaluation 
and, specifically, whether the scientific foundation 
is sound enough to permit a valid opinion about the 
individual case. If the answer is no, other evidence, 
evidence from non-experts (i.e., family, friends, police, 
victims, etc.) can still be introduced to demonstrate 
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the defendant’s level of developmental maturity at the 
time of the crime. Just as in the case of eyewitness 
identification research, the general framework 
research on adolescent behavioral and brain 
development is valuable and admissible. Whether a 
particular individual is or is not mature continues to be 
a pivotal legal issue, but may not be one that science 
can answer with any certainty.
MANAGING THE G2i DIVIDE
Managing G2i requires, foremost, the active 
involvement of both legal scholars and scientists. 
For the courts, adopting just two key best practices 
will help reduce the complexity that contemporary 
science has added to the already complex adjudicative 
task. First, courts must begin their consideration of 
scientific evidence by focusing on both whether it is 
“good”—that is, meets certain evidentiary standards—
and on what it’s good for. Every case involving expert 
evidence involves a choice: admit testimony about 
the general phenomenon, or admit such general 
testimony and diagnostic testimony. The first decision 
is separate from the second. Furthermore, diagnostic 
testimony cannot be admissible unless the testimony 
on the general phenomenon is also admissible; 
evidence that something is an instance of a larger 
phenomenon presumes that the larger phenomenon 
itself exists. 
Second, only after the court has decided whether  
the expert testimony concerns a general phenomenon, 
or concerns whether a particular case is an instance  
of that phenomenon, should it determine whether  
that testimony is admissible. While few courts  
realize it, the primary criteria derived from Daubert—
i.e., relevance, qualifications, scientific validity, added 
value or helpfulness, and unfair prejudice—operate 
differently depending on how the evidence is to  
be used. 
For scientists, and the experts who testify to the 
science, a host of issues should be paramount. The 
process of reasoning from group data to individual 
cases, of course, is principally a scientific one and, 
more particularly, a matter of statistical inference. 
The scientific community might begin by asking 
which methods or tools might be available or could 
be developed to facilitate the process. The issue 
of G2i reasoning is not unique to the courtroom. 
Meteorologists study storms, but we want to 
know whether a storm will hit during our commute 
tomorrow morning. Medical researchers study the 
effectiveness of drugs, but we want to know whether 
a particular drug will relieve our headache or, possibly, 
cause some side effects. Ordinarily, the G2i issue 
is translated into group statistical terms: “there’s 
a 60 percent chance it will be raining at 8:30 a.m. 
tomorrow.” In court, decision makers often need to 
translate those probabilities into more categorical 
terms, such as guilty/not guilty, liable/not liable, 
mature/not mature, and causation/no causation. 
Scientists could assist the process considerably 
by helping courts understand and translate the 
probabilities derived from group data to help legal 
decision makers decide individual cases.
Scientific advances in understanding the challenges of 
G2i, however, might not be far off. For instance, we 
may be on the cusp of an explosion of high-quality 
“precision” science in realms from neuroscience to 
genetics to nanotechnology. One tantalizing promise 
of science in the 21st century is knowledge at the 
level of the individual, and the challenge for courts 
in the 21st century is to distinguish between that 
promise and reality. Developing and refining a more 
sophisticated understanding of science, along with 
evidentiary guidelines that reflect that understanding, 
will enable the courts to meet that challenge now and 
in the decades to come.
For a full discussion of the material presented in this summary, including how evidentiary standards change depending whether 
an expert is offering framework or diagnostic testimony, see Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 
David L. Faigman, John Monahan, & Christopher Slobogin, 81(2) U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (2014).
For an example of how the best practices described in the above article might apply to a specific discipline, see Toward a  
Jurisprudence of Psychiatric Evidence: Examining the Challenges of Reasoning from Group Data in Psychiatry to Individual  
Decisions in the Law, Carl E. Fisher, David L. Faigman, & Paul S. Appelbaum, 69(3) U. Miami L. Rev. (2015).
Law & Neuroscience: What, Why, and Where to Begin, MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Law and Neuroscience (2016).
For more information about the work of the MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Network, visit www.lawneuro.org. 
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